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Abstract	The	long-standing	debate	of	the	role	of	affect	versus	conscious	reasoning	in	moral	judgment	has	reached	a	new	horizon,	now	that	it	is	clear	affect	has	a	place	in	this	process.	However,	our	understanding	of	what	physiological	processes	contribute	to	moral	judgment,	and	how,	is	currently	under-specified.	To	address	this	gap	in	our	knowledge,	the	current	study	utilized	a	randomized,	double-blind,	placebo-controlled	design	in	which	a	pharmacological	manipulation	was	used	to	test	if	suppressing	sympathetic	nervous	system	(SNS)	activity	caused	less	severe	moral	judgments	in	purity	violations	compared	to	unaltered	physiology.	The	study	also	tested	if	levels	of	inflammation,	a	core	component	of	the	innate	immune	system,	influences	moral	judgment	severity.	Moral	judgment	was	assessed	by	having	participants	rate	33	morally	questionable	acts	on	four	critical	dimensions	(immorality,	harm,	disgust,	and	how	much	there	is	a	victim	involved).	Inflammation	was	measured	through	blood	samples	using	immunoassay	procedures.	The	results	are	consistent	with	previous	work	showing	that	disgust	is	only	impactful	on	judgments	of	immorality	to	the	extent	that	a	violation	is	seen	as	harmful,	and	builds	on	that	to	show	that	activation	of	the	SNS	when	judging	purity	acts	contributes	to	perceptions	of	harm,	and	thus,	immorality.	The	hypothesis	that	a	relationship	exists	between	moral	judgment	severity	and	inflammation	was	not	supported.	Implications	of	the	observed	involvement	of	the	SNS	in	moral	judgment	are	made.		Keywords:	moral	judgment,	sympathetic	nervous	system,	affect,	arousal,	beta-blockers,	
inflammation,	mind-body,	psychophysiology			
PHYSIOLOGY	OF	THE	MORAL	MIND	 3	
Physiology	of	the	Moral	Mind:	The	Role	of	the	Sympathetic	Nervous	System	and	Immune	System	in	Moral	Judgments		
Historical	Roots	of	Moral	Judgment	Morality	as	a	concept	has	existed	at	least	as	long	as	scholarship,	and	just	the	sheer	amount	of	research	can	speak	to	its	rich	tradition	in	academia.	Scholars	like	Socrates	and	Plato	were	some	of	the	first	to	document	their	theories	about	what	constitutes	piety	and	living	justly,	but	naturally	another	question	followed:	how	does	one	know	something	is	immoral,	if	at	all,	in	a	given	context?	This	decision-making	process,	which	will	hereon	be	referred	to	as	a	moral	judgment,	warrants	investigation	because	of	how	long	scholars	considered	the	process	as	a	product	solely	of	the	conscious	mind,	when	we	now	know	that	it	is	a	judgment	shaped	by	the	conscious	mind,	affective	state,	and,	perhaps,	by	the	body.	Uncovering	the	exact	physiological	systems	involved	in	moral	decision-making,	however,	and	their	role	in	shaping	a	moral	judgment	is	a	particularly	contemporary	development	in	the	research	on	morality.	Modern	philosophy	has	long	considered	moral	judgments	to	be	products	exclusively	of	conscious	reasoning.	Immanuel	Kant,	among	the	most	influential	of	these	modern	philosophers,	centered	his	argument	for	moral	judgment	on	free	will	(Kant	in	Abbott	&	Dennis,	2005).	Kant	argued	that	moral	judgments	are	distinguishable	from	all	other	mental	processes	by	their	total	reliance	on	one’s	conscious,	free	willed	reasoning.	Because	of	this	emphasis	on	reasoning,	he	further	suggested	that	one’s	moral	judgments	are	unwavering,	as	any	products	of	free	will	must	also	be	reflections	of	the	holder’s	character.	This	assumed	insensitivity	to	contextual	information,	then,	constitutes	one	early	view	of	the	characteristics	that	shape	the	moral	judgment	process.	
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Conversely,	many	argue	that	moral	judgments	arise	solely	from	contextual	factors.	In	the	eighteenth	century,	Scottish	philosopher	David	Hume	was	one	of	the	first	to	treat	moral	judgments	in	this	way	(Cohon,	2010).	He	argued	that	morals	were	products	of	emotion	and	affect,	and	as	a	result,	could	fluctuate	in	severity	depending	on	the	context	of	the	situation.	This	conception	of	morality	was	groundbreaking	because	it	rejected	the	notion	that	moral	judgments	required	conscious	reasoning.	At	the	time,	it	was	unfathomable	for	some	to	think	that	their	current	emotional	or	bodily	state	could	impact	their	notions	of	good	and	evil	(Cohon,	2010),	but	subsequent	research	shows	that	Hume	was	not	alone	in	his	view.		As	technology	and	medicine	progressed,	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	saw	another	interesting	change	in	the	way	people	conceptualized	moral	judgments.	The	process	was	now	considered	as	a	product	of	the	mind,	the	emotions	it	feels,	and	the	body.	James	H.	Leuba	was	among	the	first	to	publish	with	a	view	of	morality	as	physiologically	grounded	(1897).	Leuba	(1897)	theorized	that	the	process	of	moral	judgment	functions	like	a	reflex,	dependent	on	both	the	conscious	and	unconscious	mind	interacting	with	the	body	to	process	the	emotions	and	thoughts	felt	toward	an	act.	This	approach	distinguishes	Leuba	from	typical	philosophical	conceptions	of	moral	judgment	in	two	ways.	First,	like	Hume,	he	considers	moral	judgment	a	reflexive	process,	and	not	a	consciously	reasoned	one	like	many	believed.	Secondly,	and	arguably	of	most	importance,	is	Leuba’s	belief	that	the	current	state	of	the	body	contributes	to	the	outcome	of	a	judgment,	unlike	the	philosophical	tendency	to	view	morals	as	staunch	reflections	of	one’s	character.	In	other	words,	both	Hume	and	Leuba’s	approaches	were	innovative	because	they	call	into	question	the	claim	
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that	moral	judgments	are	determined	by	conscious	will,	and	thus	the	idea	that	they	are	physiologically	unique	from	other	higher	order	processes	at	all.		
Current	Research	on	Moral	Judgment	as	an	Embodied	Process	This	historical	contrast	of	conscious	reasoning	vs.	emotional	and	bodily	context-dependence	in	moral	judgments	led	modern	psychology	researchers	to	evaluate	the	role	of	affect	in	moral	judgment	(Monin,	Pizarro,	&	Beer,	2007).	Affect’s	role	can	be	situated	under	the	social	intuitionist	model	(Haidt,	2001),	one	of	the	most	seminal	recent	models	of	moral	judgment.	This	model	posits	that	a	situation	first	elicits	an	intuitive	evaluation,	which	prompts	a	moral	judgment,	which	in	turn	prompts	moral	reasoning	after	the	fact	(Haidt,	2001).	The	role	of	affect	falls	under	the	first	step,	which	Haidt	coins	moral	intuitions.	Moral	intuition	occurs	when	one	does	not	have	any	conscious	awareness	of	having	gone	through	steps	of	searching,	evaluating	evidence,	or	deducing	a	conclusion,	yet	they	are	suddenly	aware	of	the	appearance	of	a	moral	judgment,	which	includes	their	affective	valence	(i.e.,	good-bad,	like-dislike)	(Haidt,	2001).		The	argument	that	affect	falls	under	the	first	step	of	moral	reasoning	can	be	supplemented	with	fMRI	findings	(Decety	&	Capiocco,	2012;	Decety,	Michalska,	&	Kinsler,	2012).	Neuroimaging	research	shows	that	when	considering	a	moral	act,	the	amygdala,	insula,	and	temporal	poles	are	activated	in	the	very	initial	stages	of	the	process.	The	researchers	show	that	this	simultaneous	activation,	which	can	be	understood	to	generate	affect,	serves	as	an	antecedent	to	moral	judgment	(Decety,	Michalska,	&	Kinsler,	2012).	It	is	clear,	then,	that	affect	plays	a	role	in	the	moral	intuition	step	of	the	process,	but	how	exactly	does	it	function	within	this	step?	Under	the	affect-as-information	framework,	affective	feelings	provide	information	about	the	momentary	value	of	objects	and	situations	
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(Schwarz	&	Clore,	1983,	1988).	When	making	moral	judgments,	which	are	evaluative	in	nature,	people	use	their	own	affect	to	determine	how	they	feel	about	it.	Therefore,	people	generally	judge	things	positively	to	the	extent	that	they	produce	positive	affect	and,	conversely,	judge	things	more	negatively	to	the	extent	that	they	produce	more	negative	affect	(Schnall,	Haidt,	Clore,	&	Jordan,	2008).	These	conclusions	posit	affect	as	an	automatic	component	to	moral	intuition,	which	suggests	that	these	feelings	have	a	crucial	role	in	determining	severity	of	the	eventual	judgment.	Consider,	for	example,	that	both	hypnotic	and	more	commonly-used	manipulations	of	disgust	increase	judgment	severity	(Wheatley	&	Haidt,	2005;	Schnall,	Haidt,	Clore,	&	Jordan,	2008).	Conversely,	inducing	feelings	of	cleanliness	can	reduce	the	severity	of	moral	judgments	(Schnall,	Benton,	&	Harvey,	2008).	Together,	these	studies	show	that	affect	manipulation	can	predict	moral	judgment.	However,	other	recent	literature	shows	that	affect	does	not	always	have	the	ability	to	predict	moral	judgment.	For	example,	in	a	direct	contrast	to	the	findings	of	Schnall,	Benton,	and	Harvey	(2008),	three	studies	found	that	cleanliness	–	whether	induced	through	a	physical	cleaning	or	through	a	visualization	task	–	resulted	in	more	severe	judgments	(Zhong,	Strejcek,	&	Sivanathan,	2010).	Further,	a	direct	replication	of	Schnall,	Benton,	and	Harvey	(2008)	found	that	they	could	not	mimic	the	effect	of	cleanliness	reducing	judgment	severity	(Johnson,	Cheung,	&	Donnellan,	2014).	A	final	study	offers	evidence	for	the	differences	in	effectiveness	of	affect	manipulation	when	they	found	that	affect	did	not	influence	responses	to	the	trolley	dilemma,	though	it	did	to	the	footbridge	dilemma	(Valdesolo	&	DeSteno,	2006).		
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It	is	crucial	for	the	current	study	to	understand	why	affect	induction	seems	to	impact	moral	judgment	only	under	certain	circumstances.	In	some	cases	it	is	possible	that	the	affect	manipulation	was	simply	not	strong	enough.	For	the	previously	mentioned	studies,	however,	we	hypothesize	that	it	is	because	affect	matters	most	when	the	situation	is	morally	ambiguous.	Using	the	theory	of	dyadic	morality	(Schein	&	Gray,	2017),	moral	ambiguity	here	refers	to	an	act	where	the	dyad	of	a	wrongdoing	agent	and	a	suffering	victim	is	not	overt.		Returning	to	the	opposing	findings	of	Schnall	(2008)	and	Zhong	(2010),	the	argument	that	affect	induction	will	only	impact	judgment	severity	when	the	situation	is	morally	ambiguous	is	supported	by	the	fact	that	the	only	considerable	difference	between	the	two	studies	were	the	types	of	acts	presented.	Zhong	(2010)	used	acts	where	none	involved	overt	dyads,	whereas	Schnall	(2008)	used	three	times	as	many	acts	involving	overt	dyads.	Thus,	participants	in	Zhong	‘s	study	(2010)	were	placing	judgments	on	more	morally	ambiguous	acts	compared	to	those	in	Schnall’s	(2008),	which	prompts	an	increased	use	of	affect-as-information,	which	in	turn	results	in	harsher	judgments.	Conversely,	participants	in	Schnall’s	study	(2008)	were	judging	acts	of	lesser	moral	ambiguity,	which	allowed	them	to	utilize	more	automatic	associations	between	harm	and	immorality	rather	than	be	impacted	by	affective	information,	and	thus	reported	less	severe	judgments.			Valdesolo	and	DeSteno	(2006)	also	demonstrate	the	effects	of	this	difference	with	the	trolley	and	footbridge	dilemmas.	The	two	are,	logically,	completely	equivalent	in	terms	lives	lost	and	possible	outcomes.	The	only	difference	between	the	two	is	that	the	footbridge	dilemma	requires	consideration	of	an	emotion-evoking	personal	violation	(i.e.,	directly	
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pushing	the	man	off	the	bridge)	whereas	the	trolley	dilemma	places	a	level	of	detachment	between	the	agent-victim	dyad	(i.e.,	the	switch).	Despite	the	logical	equivalence,	affect	did	not	influence	responses	to	the	trolley	dilemma,	though	it	did	to	the	footbridge	dilemma	(Valdesolo	&	DeSteno,	2006).	This	finding	shows	that	affect	only	impacts	moral	judgment	when	the	judgment	involves	an	unambiguous	act	of	harm	on	the	participant’s	part.	Altogether,	this	study	further	supports	the	idea	that	the	moral	ambiguity	of	an	act	is	key	for	determining	if	affect	manipulation	alone	will	be	sufficient	to	impact	judgment	or	not.		If	affect	matters	most	when	an	act	is	morally	ambiguous,	this	carries	implications	for	the	effectiveness	of	different	types	of	moral	infractions	on	judgment	severity.	Among	all	the	types	of	acts,	specifically	acts	that	violate	conceptions	of	purity	are	the	most	morally	ambiguous.	Consider	some	commonly	used	purity	violations:	“Watching	videos	of	animals’	copulation	to	become	sexually	aroused”	(Gray,	Schein,	&	Ward,	2014),	or	“Eating	your	dead	dog”	(Schnall,	Benton,	&	Harvey,	2008;	Haidt,	Koller,	&	Dias,	1993).	The	extent	of	victimhood	in	purity	violations	is	not	overtly	objective,	which	in	turn	makes	the	extent	of	wrongdoing	in	the	agent	more	subjective.		The	moral	ambiguity	of	purity	violations	means	that	subjectivity	also	extends	to	the	perception	of	harmfulness	of	that	violation.	The	theory	of	dyadic	morality	shows	that	perceptions	of	harm	can	cause	judgments	of	immorality,	such	that	an	act	will	be	condemned	to	the	extent	that	it	is	seen	as	harmful	(Schein	&	Gray,	2017).	Since	perceived	harm	is	flexible	in	purity	violations,	a	lack	of	an	automatic	reaction	to	an	overt	dyad	leaves	more	room	for	affect	as	information	compared	to	other	moral	acts.	It	is	natural	to	question	at	this	point	the	mechanism	by	which	affect	can	impact	judgment	of	morally	ambiguous	purity	violations.	In	a	review	of	previous	literature,	
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Cameron,	Lindquist,	and	Gray	(2015)	find	that	little	to	no	evidence	supports	the	idea	that	discrete	emotions	can	predict	morality.	Research	suggests	that	it	is	actually	the	extent	of	arousal	that	increases	the	severity	of	a	moral	judgment,	whereas	specific	emotions	themselves	are	insufficient	in	predicting	this	same	behavior	(Cheng,	Otatti,	&	Price,	2013).	That	is,	it	is	not	necessarily	considering	a	purity	act	–	for	example	–	disgusting	that	can	impact	a	moral	judgment,	but	rather	the	extent	of	disgust	that	can	cause	a	change.			
New	Directions	for	Moral	Judgment:	Sympathetic	Nervous	System	Information		The	previous	literature	implies	that	the	most	likely	physiological	systems	to	contribute	to	moral	judgment	are	those	that	have	the	ability	to	impact	initial	affect	to	an	act.	Given	that	affect	and	autonomic	arousal	have	demonstrated	covariation	(Cuthbert	et	al,	2000),	the	current	study’s	first	variable	of	interest	is	the	sympathetic	nervous	system	(SNS).	Activation	of	the	SNS	is	associated	with	high	arousal	and	is	accompanied	by	symptoms	like	increased	heart	rate	and	sweating.	The	sympathetic	nervous	system	also	activates	when	one	perceives	something	as	stressful,	threatening,	or	otherwise	emotionally	stimulating,	whereas	the	parasympathetic	activates	during	a	baseline,	relaxed	state.	The	primary	goal	of	the	current	study	was	to	assess	whether	the	sympathetic	nervous	system	affects	moral	judgment.	We	hypothesized	that	if	the	SNS	is	suppressed	rather	than	allowed	to	vary	as	usual,	individuals’	moral	judgments	will	be	formed	by	relaxed	baseline	state	information	rather	than	a	state	of	high	arousal.	Thus,	moral	judgments	under	a	state	of	SNS	suppression	should	be	less	severe.	One	way	to	modulate	SNS	activity	is	by	pharmacologically	suppressing	the	SNS	via	drugs	that	block	beta-adrenergic	receptors	in	the	brain	and	body	(i.e.,	beta-blockers).	Beta-blockers	are	a	class	of	psychotropic	drug	that	acts	on	adrenoreceptors,	and	activating	or	
PHYSIOLOGY	OF	THE	MORAL	MIND	 10	
blocking	these	receptors	can	increase	or	decrease	levels	of	noradrenaline	activity,	respectively	(Terbeck,	Savelescu,	Chesterman,	&	Cowen,	2016).	Because	noradrenaline	mediates	SNS	activity,	beta-blockers	are	considered	a	valid	way	to	suppress	the	system.	The	current	study	specifically	uses	the	beta-blocker	propranolol,	which	acts	both	centrally	and	peripherally	to	block	β1	and	β2	receptors.	Physicians	typically	prescribe	propranolol	to	treat	hypertension,	which	is	the	original	reason	for	its	creation	(Terbeck,	Savelescu,	Chesterman,	&	Cowen,	2016).	More	recently,	however,	beta-blockers	have	been	a	popular	prescription	medication	for	attenuating	stress,	acute	anxiety,	and	performance	anxiety	(Terbeck,	Savelescu,	Chesterman,	&	Cowen,	2016).		In	fact,	the	reason	that	beta-blockers	are	commonly	prescribed	for	these	conditions	is	the	same	reason	why	we	propose	that	the	drug	has	the	ability	to	impact	moral	judgment:	Propranolol	reduces	physiological	markers	of	high	arousal	following	emotion-evoking	stimuli	(Mills	&	Dimsdale,	1991).	This	reduced	bodily	arousal	likely	contributes	to	a	more	recent	discovery	from	fMRI	research	that	found	the	drug	also	disrupts	the	normal	encoding	of	emotional	material	in	the	amygdala	(Van	Stegeren	et	al,	2005).	Reduced	encoding	of	emotion	has	consequences	for	morality	because,	from	a	constructionist	approach,	moral	judgments	are	contingent	upon	the	arousal	of	numerous	and	varied	information,	rather	than	the	outcome	of	one	shared	modular	process	(Cameron,	Lindquist,	&	Gray,	2015).	Combining	this	idea	with	the	aforementioned	social	intuitionist	model,	a	suppressed	SNS	has	the	potential	to	reduce	this	initial	arousal,	which,	in	turn,	informs	the	automatic	intuition	that	predicts	moral	judgment	severity.		 The	only	published	study	to	date	that	examines	beta-blockers	in	relation	to	moral	judgment	found	that	participants	who	had	taken	a	beta-blocker	were	more	likely	to	judge	
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sacrificial	actions	as	morally	unacceptable	compared	to	participants	on	placebo	(Terbeck	et	al.,	2013).	Moreover,	this	effect	was	only	found	when	the	acts	involved	more	active	and	direct	harm.	The	authors	note	that	their	findings	suggest	that	noradrenergic	pathways	play	a	role	in	responses	to	moral	dilemmas,	but	contrary	to	current	theorizing,	their	findings	also	suggest	that	aversion	to	harming	is	not	driven	by	arousal.	These	conclusions	are	curious,	given	the	overwhelming	evidence	suggesting	that	the	results	should	have	been	the	other	way	around:	the	control	participants	–	with	unaltered	arousal	–	should	have	made	more	severe	judgments	compared	to	the	beta-blocker	participants.	However,	the	effect’s	conditionality	on	acts	of	direct	harm	helps	clarify	why	the	Terbeck	(2013)	study	may	have	found	the	results	they	did.	The	finding	that	propranolol	caused	less	severe	judgments	only	in	situations	of	direct	harm	makes	more	sense	under	the	argument	that	negative	affect	leads	to	more	severe	judgments	only	when	the	situation	is	morally	ambiguous.	The	overtness	of	the	harm	done	in	the	acts	facilitates	more	automatic	associations	between	harm	and	immorality,	rather	than	leaving	more	room	to	be	impacted	by	affective	information.	When	combined	with	a	significant	reduction	in	arousal	to	begin	with,	propranolol	participants	thus	reported	less	severe	judgments.	Moreover,	the	authors	of	the	Terbeck	(2013)	study	note	that	it	is	possible	that	the	reduction	in	anxiety	associated	with	propranolol	played	a	role	in	increasing	judgment	confidence,	thus	making	beta-blocker	participants	more	willing	to	report	severe	judgments	compared	to	placebo	participants.				 In	addition,	the	study	carries	the	limitation	of	a	small	sample	size,	so	a	replication	with	a	larger	sample	size	and	more	varied	stimuli	(i.e.,	moral	acts	without	physical	harm)	is	warranted.		
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New	Directions	for	Moral	Judgment:	Immune	System	Information	It	seems	plausible	that	a	change	in	sympathetic	nervous	system	activity,	and	thus	a	change	in	affect,	could	prompt	a	more	severe	moral	judgment.	However,	is	it	possible	that	other	bodily	systems	may	also	affect	moral	judgments?	Individual	differences	in	the	activation	of	bodily	systems	are	important	to	understand	because	not	all	moral	judgments	involve	contexts	exaggerated	enough	to	cause	a	considerable	change	in	sympathetic	activity.	In	other	words,	without	the	contextual	factors	known	to	trigger	SNS	activation,	we	now	aim	to	test	if	the	individual	state	of	one’s	body	itself	can	predict	moral	judgment	severity.		 One	such	individually-dependent	characteristic	of	the	body	lies	in	the	immune	system.	The	immune	system	is	responsible	for	both	recognizing	one’s	cellular	composition	and	responding	to	unfamiliar	cells	should	they	disrupt	this	composition	(Gabay,	2006).	One	specific	function	of	the	immune	system	that	the	current	study	aims	to	test	is	inflammation.		The	inflammatory	process	identifies	and	clears	out	dead	cells	and	damaged	tissue	from	breached	cellular	compositions,	as	well	as	initiating	tissue	repair	(Gabay,	2006).	Inflammation	leads	to	symptoms	like	swelling,	redness,	pain,	and	an	increase	in	heat	in	the	affected	area,	which	may	be	internal	(e.g.,	an	artery	swells)	or	external	(e.g.,	a	paper	cut	turns	red	and	painful).	This	process	can	be	acute,	as	caused	by	a	sudden	injury	or	illness,	or	chronic,	as	caused	by	autoimmune	diseases	or	failure	to	eliminate	a	persisting	irritant	to	the	system.	As	such,	everyone	has	an	individual	level	of	inflammation	largely	adapted	to	his	or	her	unique	environmental	factors	that	is	always	functioning	(Gabay,	2006).			 While	the	interaction	between	the	sympathetic	nervous	system	and	inflammation	has	been	studied	extensively,	no	published	research	exists	on	the	relationship	between	
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inflammation	levels	and	moral	judgment	severity.	Though	the	current	study	examined	the	effects	of	sympathetic	activation	and	inflammation	on	moral	judgment	separately,	the	close	biological	intertwining	of	the	two	processes	(see	Pongratz	&	Straub,	2014)	suggests	it	is	possible	that	the	two	systems	inform	moral	judgment	similarly.	Empirically,	individual	differences	in	current	inflammation	levels	can	indirectly	predict	arousal.			 This	indirect	impact	can	be	explained	via	personality	traits:	increased	levels	of	interleukin-6,	a	biomarker	of	inflammation,	are	associated	with	neuroticism	(Armon	et	al.,	2013).	Further,	neuroticism	is	also	positively	associated	with	both	emotional	sensitivity	(Larsen	&	Ketelaar,	1991)	and	autonomic	arousal	(Brumbaugh	et	al.,	2013),	it	is	possible	that	this	link	also	exists	for	individual	differences	in	current	levels	of	inflammation.	Moreover,	acute	inflammation	has	been	shown	to	impair	social	cognitive	processing	(Moieni,	Irwin,	Jevtic,	Breen,	&	Eisenberger,	2015),	so	perhaps	individual	levels	of	inflammation	can	predict	the	variability	in	that	processing.		
Predictions			
Hypothesis	I.	Emotional	and	bodily	arousal	impacts	one’s	assessment	of	a	morally	questionable	act,	such	that	the	salience	of	these	negative	signals	correlates	with	the	level	of	ascribed	immorality.	Given	that	beta-blockers	dampen	arousal,	thus	likely	dampening	negative	affect	toward	an	act	as	well,	we	hypothesized	that	participants	receiving	the	drug	will	make	less	severe	moral	judgments	in	purity	violations	than	those	receiving	a	placebo.	Though	the	only	study	to	test	this	found	different	results	(Terbeck	et	al.,	2013),	this	hypothesis	is	made	on	the	basis	of	the	overwhelming	literature	suggesting	that	less	arousal	leads	to	less	severe	moral	judgments,	combined	with	the	fact	that	the	previous	study	did	not	have	a	sufficient	sample	size.	If	the	current	study	finds	support	for	this	hypothesis,	this	
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would	be	a	crucial	addition	to	the	literature	exhibiting	that	the	SNS	plays	a	role	in	shaping	the	context	of	a	moral	judgment.		
Hypothesis	II.	Given	that	inflammation	shares	a	positively	associated	link	with	arousal	via	neuroticism,	we	hypothesized	that	participants	will	display	a	positive	relationship	with	moral	judgment	severity	in	purity	violations,	such	that	as	levels	of	current	inflammation	increase,	so	will	severity.	This	is	the	first	known	study	to	examine	a	relationship	between	inflammation	and	moral	judgment.	
Method	
Participants		 This	study	utilized	a	sample	of	83	participants	between	the	ages	of	18	to	25	years	old	(35	women	and	47	men),	with	a	mean	age	of	20.33	(SD	=	1.52).	The	racial/ethnic	make-up	of	the	sample	was	56%	White	(90.5%	non-Hispanic;	9.5%	Hispanic),	30.6%	Asian,	9.3%	Black,	and	4%	Biracial	participants.	Participants	were	recruited	through	flyers	posted	both	on	UNC-Chapel	Hill’s	campus	and	in	popular	areas	in	the	town	nearby,	as	well	as	through	announcements	made	in	large	lecture	classes.	Participants	were	within	a	healthy	range	for	body	mass	index,	and	were	prescreened	for	chronic	mental	and	physical	illnesses,	cigarette	smoking,	pregnancy,	history	of	substance	abuse,	allergies	(apart	from	common	seasonal	allergies),	low	blood	pressure,	fainting	spells,	and	presence	of	a	pacemaker.	If	found	to	meet	one	of	these	criteria,	potential	participants	were	excluded	from	the	study.	
Procedure		Data	were	drawn	from	a	larger	study	examining	the	effects	of	sympathetic	nervous	system	suppression	on	perceived	stress	and	inflammation.	For	the	purposes	of	this	study,	we	are	only	concerned	with	how	the	SNS	suppression	relates	to	the	judgments	on	the	
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moral	judgment	task	(MJT;	see	below	for	more	information),	as	well	as	how	baseline	levels	of	inflammation	are	associated	with	MJT	responses.	As	such,	the	following	procedure	only	describes	the	steps	relevant	to	the	current	study.		Each	participant	was	asked	to	read	and	sign	two	consent	forms,	one	to	participate	in	research	and	one	to	participate	in	biological	specimen	collection.	Participants	then	filled	out	a	Daily	Health	Inventory,	which	assessed	for	possible	confounding	variables	such	as	nicotine	and	caffeine	use,	level	of	hunger,	sleep	pattern	disturbances,	and	recent	major	life	events.	If	a	participant	reported	having	used	nicotine	or	caffeine	in	the	three	hours	prior	to	the	session,	had	major	sleep	disturbances,	was	extremely	hungry,	or	recently	experienced	a	major	life	event,	they	were	rescheduled	for	a	later	day.		After	the	consent	forms	and	Daily	Health	Inventory,	research	nurses	from	the	Clinical	and	Translational	Research	Center	at	UNC-Chapel	Hill	inserted	a	catheter	into	the	participant’s	non-dominant	forearm;	the	first	blood	draw	was	completed	at	least	45	minutes	after	catheter	insertion,	so	as	to	minimize	the	effect	of	potential	arousal	and	inflammation	from	the	needle-stick.	Then,	one	group	of	participants	was	randomly	assigned	to	take	a	single,	40mg	dose	of	propranolol,	while	the	other	group	took	a	placebo	pill.	To	ensure	the	minimization	of	bias,	drug	administration	was	performed	as	a	double-blind	procedure.	Participants	waited	one	hour	for	the	drug	to	activate,	during	which	time	they	watched	neutral	video	clips	taken	from	the	nature	show	Planet	Earth.	After	this,	research	nurses	performed	the	blood	draw,	taking	24	mL	of	blood	total	and	distributing	it	between	four	EDTA	tubes.	After	spending	approximately	three	hours	performing	tasks	for	the	larger	study,	participants	then	completed	the	MJT	and	signaled	when	they	were	finished,	after	which	point	the	experimenter	checked	participants’	heart	rate	and	blood	
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pressure	to	see	if	they	were	greater	than	60	BPM	and	80	mm/Hg,	respectively.	This	step	was	performed	to	ensure	the	participant	had	safely	processed	the	drug,	which	has	known	side	effects	of	light-headedness	and	dizziness,	before	leaving	the	session.	Participants	received	a	debriefing	that	explained	the	purpose	of	the	study	and	how	it	was	designed,	and	lastly	received	compensation	of	$25	per	hour.	
Measures	
Moral	Judgment	Task.	Moral	judgment	was	tested	via	a	Moral	Judgment	Task	(MJT).	The	MJT	contains	33	different	morally	questionable	acts,	comprising	six	types	of	moral	infractions.	Items	representing	four	types	of	moral	infractions	were	adapted	from	Graham,	Haidt,	and	Nosek	(2009)	and	Haidt,	Koller,	and	Dias	(1993):	purity	violations	(e.g.	“Rubbing	feces	on	the	bible”),	ingroup/loyalty	betrayal	(e.g.	“Cheating	on	your	spouse	after	20	years	of	marriage”),	cheating	(e.g.	“Cheating	in	class	to	get	a	good	grade”),	subversion	(e.g.	“Forging	someone’s	signature	on	a	legal	document”).	Items	representing	two	additional	types	of	moral	infractions	were	adapted	from	Tybur,	Lieberman,	and	Griskevicius	(2009):	sexual	disgust	(e.g.	“Hearing	two	strangers	having	sex”),	and	pathological	disgust	(e.g.	“Accidentally	touching	a	person’s	bloody	cut”).	The	MJT	also	included	two	types	of	control	acts	to	control	for	response	bias.	One	group	was	a	neutral	control	(e.g.	“Folding	a	letter	to	place	in	an	envelope”)	while	the	other	was	a	sad	control	(e.g.	“A	little	girl	losing	her	beloved	teddy	bear”).	The	scenarios	appeared	in	a	randomized	order.	Using	rating	scales	that	ranged	from	1	to	6,	participants	rated	each	of	the	scenarios	on	four	dimensions,	which	were	also	presented	in	a	randomized	order:	How	immoral	(Not	
immoral	to	Extremely	immoral),	how	harmful	(Not	harmful	to	Extremely	harmful),	how	gross	(Not	gross	to	Extremely	gross),	and	how	much	is	there	a	victim	involved	(Definitely	no	
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to	Definitely	yes).	Moral	judgment	was	conceptualized	in	this	way	(as	opposed	to	solely	measuring	how	immoral	an	act	is)	to	ensure	that	all	the	components	with	the	potential	to	contribute	to	an	overall	perception	of	immorality	were	measured	(maybe	cite	Kurt	and	Chelsea’s	work	that	uses	these	scales?).		
	 Inflammation.	Inflammation	was	measured	via	blood	samples,	which	were	kept	in	four	EDTA	Vacutainer	tubes.	The	samples	were	immediately	put	on	ice	and	centrifuged	for	collection	of	plasma	and	frozen	at	-80°C	until	assays	were	performed.	Concentrations	of	IL-6	and	TNFα,	the	biomarkers	of	interest	for	inflammation,	were	measured	using V-PLEX	Proinflammatory	Panel	1	Human	Kits	purchased	from	Meso	Scale	Discovery.	Assaying	procedures	were	performed	in	accordance	with	the	manufacturer’s	protocols,	and	within-	and	between-assay	coefficients	of	variation	were	<	9%.		
Results	
Hypothesis	I	
	 Differences	across	moral	categories.	Since	we	hypothesized	that	participants	receiving	the	drug	will	make	less	severe	moral	judgments	in	purity	violations	than	those	receiving	a	placebo,	we	elected	to	run	mixed	model	repeated-measures	analyses	of	variance	to	look	for	interactions	between	drug	treatment	and	the	different	types	of	scenarios	in	the	MJT.	Before	running	tests,	we	first	regrouped	the	eight	types	of	moral	scenarios	into	five	categories	in	order	to	emphasize	the	difference	between	dyads:	subjective	dyads	(purity	violations),	overt	dyads	(betrayal,	cheating,	and	subversion	acts),	dyads	with	unintentional	agents	(pathogenically	disgusting	and	sexually	disgusting	acts),	and	two	categories	with	no	dyads	(neutral	control	and	sad	neutral	acts).	We	also	elected	to	
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collapse	the	harm	and	victim	ratings	into	one	dependent	variable	(harm/victim,	or	simply	harm	from	hereon)	due	to	their	conceptual	and	statistical	(r	=	.53)	similarity.	
	 Immorality.		We	first	ran	a	mixed	model	repeated-measures	ANOVA	for	immorality	ratings	where	the	within-subjects	factors	were	the	5	moral	categories	and	the	between-subjects	factor	was	the	drug	condition	(propranolol:	n=40;	placebo:	n=43).	There	was	a	main	effect	of	scenario	category	on	immorality	(MJT	question	type),	F(1,	81)	=	508.6,	p	=	.000.	The	test	revealed	no	significant	two-way	interaction	between	immorality	ratings	and	drug	condition,	F(1,	81)	=	1.216,	p	=	.304.	Refer	to	Graph	1	for	comparison	of	means	across		acts.	 	
	
Graph	1.	Differences	in	perceptions	of	immorality	across	moral	categories	by	drug	treatment.	Note:	error	bars	in	all	graphs	represent	standard	error.	Note:	**	=	but	involves	affect.	
Harm	and	Victim.	We	then	ran	another	mixed	model	repeated-measures	ANOVA	for	harm/victim	ratings	where	the	within-subjects	factors	were	the	5	moral	categories	and	the	between-subjects	factor	was	the	drug	condition	(propranolol:	n	=	40;	placebo:	n	=	43).	There	was	a	main	effect	of	scenario	category	on	harm/victim,	F(1,	81)	=	203.17,	p	=	.000.	
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The	test	yielded	a	significant	two-way	interaction	between	harm/victim	ratings	and	drug	condition,	F(1,	81)	=	4.299,	p	=	.002.	Refer	to	Graph	2	for	a	comparison	of	means	across	categories.	 
 Simple	effect	tests	revealed	that	experimental	and	control	participants	significantly	differed	in	their	perceptions	of	harm	done	specifically	in	acts	of	purity	violations	(p	<	.05),	whereas	this	same	effect	was	not	supported	for	overtly	dyadic,	disgusting,	sad	control,	and	neutral	control	acts.	
	
Graph	2.	Differences	in	perceptions	of	harm/victim	across	moral	categories	by	drug	treatment.	Note:	*	=	p<.05;	**	=	but	involves	affect.	
Grossness.	As	the	last	test	analyzing	differences	across	all	scenarios,	we	ran	another	mixed	model	repeated-measures	ANOVA	for	grossness	ratings.	Again,	the	within-subjects	factors	were	the	5	moral	categories	and	the	between-subjects	factor	was	the	drug	condition.	There	was	a	main	effect	of	scenario	category	on	grossness,	F(1,	81)	=	159.84,	p	=	.000.	The	ANOVA	showed	a	significant	two-way	interaction	between	grossness	ratings	and	
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drug	condition,	F(1,	81)	=	2.689,	p	=	.031. Refer	to	Graph	3	for	a	comparison	of	means	across	categories.				 Like	the	harm/victim	analysis	showed,	simple	effect	tests	again	revealed	that	experimental	and	control	participants	significantly	differed	in	their	perceptions	of	harm	done	specifically	in	acts	of	purity	violations	(p	<	.05),	whereas	this	same	effect	was	not	supported	for	overtly	dyadic,	disgusting,	sad	control,	and	neutral	control	acts.		
	
Graph	3.	Differences	in	perceptions	of	grossness	across	moral	categories	by	drug	treatment.	Note:	*	=	p<.05;	**	=	but	involves	affect.	
Mediation	analyses	of	purity	violations.	Since	the	simple	effects	showed	that	specifically	acts	that	violate	purity	exhibited	significant	differences,	we	used	mediation	to	determine	what	exactly	about	these	acts	contributed	to	perceptions	of	immorality.	Thus,	we	tested	for	the	indirect	effects	of	grossness	and	harm/victim	ratings	as	potential	mediators	of	the	effect	of	drug	treatment	on	the	immorality	ratings	of	purity	violations.	We	
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deemed	this	a	valid	test	despite	there	being	a	nonsignificant	effect	of	drug	condition	on	immorality	ratings	because	recent	statistical	work	shows	that	the	causal	steps	approach	is	not	necessary	for	concluding	mediation	in	an	association	between	two	variables	(Hayes,	2009;	Shrout	&	Bolger,	2002).	Mediation	was	performed	via	the	PROCESS	macro	(Hayes,	2013)	using	5,000	bootstrap	samples.  
Grossness as mediator. Utilizing	a	simple	mediation	model	(model	4	in	PROCESS),	this	test	placed	drug	condition	as	the	IV,	immorality	ratings	of	purity	violations	as	the	DV,	and	ratings	of	the	grossness	of	those	same	violations	as	a	mediator	(see	Figure	1).	There	was	a	nonsignificant	total	effect	of	drug	condition	on	immorality	ratings	of	purity	violations,	b	=	.36,	SE	=	.24,	t(82)	=	1.49,	p	=	.14.	Drug	condition	was	significantly	associated	with	grossness	ratings,	b	=	.60,	and	grossness	was	significantly	associated	with	increased	immorality	ratings,	b	=	.82.	The	mediation	test	showed	a	significant	indirect	effect	of	drug	condition	on	immorality	ratings	of	purity	violations	through	ratings	of	grossness,	b	=	.49,	SE	
=	.17,	95%	CI	[.15,	.87],	leaving	a	nonsignificant	direct	effect,	b	=	-.13,	SE	=	.18,	t(82)	-.744,	
p=.459,	95%	CI	[-.48,	.22].		
																												 	
Figure	1.	Concept	diagram	for	simple	mediation	using	gross	
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Harm/Victim	as	mediator.	Also	a	simple	mediation	model,	this	test	placed	drug	condition	as	the	IV,	immorality	ratings	of	purity	violations	as	the	DV,	and	the	harm/victim	ratings	of	those	violations	as	the	mediator	(see	Figure	2).	Again,	the	total	effect	of	drug	condition	on	immorality	ratings	of	purity	violations	was	nonsignificant,	b	=	.36,	SE	=	.24,	
t(82)	=	1.49,	p	=	.14.	Drug	condition	was	significantly	associated	with	harm/victim	ratings,	
b	=	.81,	and	harm/victim	ratings	were	significantly	associated	with	increased	immorality	ratings,	b	=	.63.	Mediation	revealed	a	significant	indirect	effect	of	drug	condition	on	immorality	ratings	of	purity	violations	through	harm/victim	ratings,	b	=	.52,	SE	=	.18,	95%	CI	[.20,	.91],	leaving	a	nonsignificant	direct	effect,	b	=	-.16,	SE	=	.20,	t(82)	-.779,	p=.438,	95%	CI	[-.55,	.24].		
								 	
Figure	2.	Concept	diagram	for	simple	mediation	using	harm/victim	
Dual	mediators.	To	see	which	factor,	grossness	or	harm/victim,	impacted	immorality	ratings	of	purity	violations	more	strongly,	we	finally	used	a	dual	mediator	model	(model	6	in	PROCESS;	see	Figure	3).	Now	tested	simultaneously,	the	mediation	showed	that	the	indirect	effect	of	drug	condition	on	immorality	through	harm/victim	ratings	was	still	significant,	b	=	.26,	SE	=	.12,	95%	CI	[.07,	.53],	while	the	indirect	effect	of	the	same	variables	through	grossness	ratings	was	now	nonsignificant,	b	=	.11,	SE	=	.11,	95%	
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CI	[-.10,	.32].	The	direct	effect	of	drug	condition	on	immorality	ratings	was	nonsignificant,	b	
=	-.26,	SE	=	.17,	t(82)	-1.57,	p	=	.120,	95%	CI	[-.60,	.07].		
				 	
Figure	3.	Concept	diagram	for	simultaneous	testing	of	mediators	
Hypothesis	II	
	 Analyses	for	the	second	hypothesis	were	performed	on	n	=	82	as	we	were	missing	
n=1	from	the	original	sample	(removed	because	did	not	undergo	immunoassaying).	To	test	the	effect	of	levels	of	current	inflammation	on	moral	judgment	severity,	we	first	created	a	distribution	of	the	inflammatory	data	across	the	study.	We	did	this	to	ensure	the	pharmacological	manipulation	used	for	hypothesis	I	did	not	cause	bimodality.	Because	the	data	was	not	bimodal	and	both	the	multiplex	immunoassay	kits	and	the	MJT	produce	a	range	of	ratio-level	responses,	we	utilized	four	Pearson’s	r	correlation	tests	for	each	of	the	four	dimensions	of	the	MJT.			There	was	no	significant	correlation	between	immorality	ratings	and	levels	of	current	IL-6,	r	=	.087,	p	=.439,	nor	between	immorality	ratings	and	current	levels	of	TNFα,	r	=	-.017,	p	=.878.	There	were	also	no	significant	correlations	between	harmfulness	(r	=	.171,	
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p	=.125),	grossness	(r	=	-.088,	p	=.432),	nor	extent	of	victimhood	(r	=	.028,	p	=.803)	ratings	and	current	levels	of	IL-6.	The	same	was	true	for	the	relationship	between	the	moral	judgment	ratings	and	current	levels	of	TNFα	(harm:	r	=	.069,	p	=.538;	gross:	r	=	.064,	p	=	.571;	victim:	r	=	.078,	p	=.490).		Because	we	did	not	find	any	significant	relationships	between	inflammation	biomarkers	and	the	main	four	MJT	ratings,	we	elected	to	only	run	correlations	for	the	ratings	by	moral	category	that	had	significant	effects	from	hypothesis	I.	The	correlations	revealed	no	significant	relationships	between	IL-6	and	ratings	of	harm	in	purity	violations	(r	=	.104,	p	=.354),	ratings	of	grossness	in	purity	violations	(r	=	.080,	p	=.473),	nor	with	ratings	of	victimhood	in	purity	violations	(r	=	.091,	p	=.417).	Similarly,	the	correlations	also	showed	no	significant	relationships	between	TNFα	and	ratings	of	harm	in	purity	violations	(r	=	.022,	p	=.846),	ratings	of	grossness	in	purity	violations	(r	=	-.026,	p	=.818),	nor	with	ratings	of	victimhood	in	purity	violations	(r	=	.018,	p	=.871).	
Discussion	To	reiterate,	the	goals	of	this	study	were	first	to	demonstrate	that	suppression	of	the	sympathetic	nervous	system	causes	less	severe	moral	judgment	about	purity	violations	compared	to	unaltered	physiology,	and	secondly,	to	explore	whether	there	was	a	relationship	between	inflammation	and	moral	judgments.	The	results	of	the	first	research	question	indicate	that	participants	on	propranolol	made	less	severe	moral	judgments	about	purity	violations	than	those	receiving	a	placebo	when	it	came	to	perceptions	of	harmfulness,	grossness,	and	the	extent	of	victimhood.	The	results	of	the	second	question	demonstrate	that	inflammation,	specifically	measured	through	the	biomarkers	IL-6	and	TNFα,	does	not	appear	to	share	a	significant	relationship	
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with	judgments	of	immorality,	harmfulness,	grossness,	nor	the	extent	of	victimhood	in	acts	of	purity	violations	or	otherwise.		Though	a	suppression	of	the	SNS	affected	perceptions	of	factors	that	have	the	potential	to	contribute	to	immorality	(i.e.,	harm,	disgust,	victimhood),	it	did	not	affect	judgments	of	overall	immorality.	To	date,	this	is	the	first	study	to	demonstrate	that	an	experimental	manipulation	of	physiological	state	can	cause	less	severe	perceptions	of	indicators	of	immorality	compared	to	an	unaltered	body	state.	Though	the	correlations	proved	weak	in	this	instance,	this	is	also	the	first	study	to	date	that	tests	the	relationship	between	inflammation	and	moral	judgment.		The	finding	that	SNS	suppression	can	cause	one	to	perceive	a	lesser	extent	of	indicators	of	immorality,	but	not	immorality	itself,	in	purity	violations	seems	difficult	to	interpret	initially.	However,	the	results	of	the	mediation	analyses	illuminate	this	interpretation.		Mediation	showed	that	by	themselves,	perceptions	of	grossness	and	harmfulness	both	have	the	ability	to	fully	mediate	a	link	between	drug	treatment	and	judgments	of	immorality.	When	tested	simultaneously,	though,	the	now-nonsignificance	of	grossness	suggests	that	harm	is	the	key	mediator	between	SNS	suppression	and	judgments	of	immorality.	Further,	the	change	from	significance	to	nonsignificance	in	grossness	with	the	addition	of	harm	as	a	mediator	suggests	that,	in	the	context	of	moral	judgment,	SNS	suppression	only	allows	for	grossness	to	impact	immorality	through	perceptions	of	harm.		The	conclusion	that	a	suppression	of	the	SNS	causes	grossness	to	impact	immorality	only	through	perceptions	of	harm	is	consistent	with	some	previous	literature	and	challenges	others.	Schein,	Ritter,	and	Gray	(2016)	show	that	harm,	in	line	with	the	theory	of	dyadic	morality,	fully	mediates	the	previously	established	link	between	disgust	and	
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immorality,	even	when	the	act	is	overtly	harmless.	This	finding	is	consistent	with	the	current	study,	as	all	the	acts	used	were	overtly	harmless	(i.e.,	involved	no	physical	harm),	and	yet	still	a	removal	of	arousal-as-information	produced	lessened	perceptions	of	the	extent	of	harm	done.	This	connects	to	purity	violations	because	many	definitions	of	impurity	are	synonymous	with	immorality,	which	as	we	(and	others;	e.g.,	Schein	&	Gray,	2015)	have	shown,	is	best	predicted	by	harm.	Thus,	less	arousal-as-information	when	considering	a	subjective	dyadic	act	decreases	judgments	of	harm,	which	in	turn	has	the	potential	to	decrease	perceptions	of	immorality.	The	findings	of	the	current	study	challenge	previous	work	under	the	Moral	Foundations	Theory	(MFT)	(Haidt	&	Graham,	2007;	Haidt	&	Joseph,	2004).	Under	the	MFT,	purity	violations	are	judged	in	such	a	way	that	is	distinct	from	concerns	about	harm,	and	further,	are	specifically	predicted	by	disgust	(Graham	et	al,	2013).	MFT	intuits	this	because	if	an	act	is	judged	as	both	harmless	and	wrong	(e.g.,	cleaning	one’s	toilet	with	the	flag),	there	must	also	exist	a	mechanism	independent	of	harm	that	explains	why	disgusting	acts	seem	wrong—hence	the	distinctness	of	purity	judgments.	However,	the	findings	of	the	current	study	are	consistent	with	newer	research	(e.g.,	Schein,	Ritter,	&	Gray,	2016;	Schein	&	Gray,	2015)	suggesting	that	these	overtly	“harmless”	purity	violations	are	not	perceived	as	harmless	at	all,	and	further,	that	disgust	is	only	impactful	to	the	extent	that	a	violation	is	seen	as	harmful.	Where	the	current	study	extends	this	new	research	on	purity	and	moral	judgment,	then,	is	by	showing	that	physiological	information	contributes	to	the	perception	of	harm.	Specifically,	the	current	study	is	the	first	to	show	that	activation	of	the	sympathetic	nervous	system	when	judging	purity	acts	contributes	to	perceptions	of	harm,	and	thus,	immorality.	
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By	association,	then,	the	SNS	acts	as	a	source	of	affective	information	when	the	judgment	involves	an	ambiguous	dyad.	Further,	the	results	of	the	current	study	imply	that	arousal	has	the	potential	to	mediate	the	extent	of	perceived	dyad	in	a	given	act.	Understanding	the	exact	physiological	systems	involved	in	this	process	is	important	because	it	illuminates	how	context	can	impact	moral	judgment.		This	research	is	also	novel	because	it	implies	that	moral	judgments	can	be	affected	by	a	misattribution	of	arousal.	Misattribution	of	arousal	(Schachter	&	Singer,	1962)	occurs	when	an	individual	experiences	arousal	from	stimuli	in	Situation	A,	and	subsequently	misattributes	the	residual	arousal	to	stimuli	in	Situation	B	rather	than	from	Situation	A.	For	example,	emotional	arousal	can	influence	height	perception:	participants	viewed	arousing	images,	and	soon	after	overestimated	the	height	of	a	two-story	balcony	compared	to	participants	who	viewed	nonarousing	images	(Stefanucci	&	Storbeck,	2009).	Misattribution	of	arousal	studies	have	linked	a	broad	range	of	emotional	states	to	multiple	types	of	judgments,	such	as	fear,	aggression,	and	sexual	excitation	to	judgments	such	as	attractiveness,	musical	appreciation,	and	funniness	of	cartoons	(Vosgerau,	2010).	This	research	suggests	that	because	the	SNS	contributes	to	the	affective	information	used	in	moral	judgments	by	way	of	arousal,	the	stimuli	in	moral	judgments	are	also	susceptible	to	misattribution	from	previous	SNS	activation.	That	is,	perhaps	important	moral	decisions	should	not	be	made	following	considerable	sympathetic	activation	(e.g.	social	stress,	exercising,	etc.),	as	they	will	be	more	likely	to	deviate	from	one’s	judgment	of	the	same	situation	at	a	baseline	state.		We	offer	some	limitations	of	this	research	that	may	explain	the	lack	of	support	for	our	second	hypothesis.	One	limitation	of	the	current	study	is	that	the	same	participants	
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were	used	for	both	hypotheses.	That	is,	participants	first	underwent	a	drug	treatment	for	hypothesis	I	and	also	provided	the	blood	samples	analyzed	for	hypothesis	II.	This	is	a	limitation	because,	though	it	did	not	create	bimodal	inflammation	data,	having	some	significantly	less	aroused	participants	could	have	weakened	the	relationship	with	moral	judgment	compared	to	if	all	had	unaltered	body	states.	Thus,	for	future	replication	of	hypothesis	II,	we	suggest	utilizing	participants	who	have	not	received	previous	pharmacological	treatment	or	any	other	affect	or	autonomic	arousal	manipulation.	Another	limitation	of	this	study	that	could	explain	the	weak	relationship	between	inflammation	and	moral	judgment	is	the	timing	of	the	blood	draw.	40mg	of	propranolol	has	a	half-life	of	around	five	hours	(Bryson,	1997),	which	suggests	there	was	still	some	effect,	but	the	drug	is	most	active	about	an	hour	after	administration	(Bryson,	1997).	Therefore,	having	the	blood	draw	approximately	2.5	hours	after	drug	treatment	suggests	that	the	samples	analyzed	for	hypothesis	II	were	not	at	peak	bioavailability	for	inflammatory	markers.	This	is	a	limitation	because	it	is	possible	that	the	relationship	between	inflammation	and	moral	judgment	would	be	stronger	if	the	immunoassay	captured	the	fullest	possible	extent	of	each	participant’s	biomarkers.	Our	findings	leave	many	possible	avenues	for	future	research.	Future	research	would	do	well	to	elucidate	the	cognitive	and	physiological	differences	between	judging	how	immoral	something	is,	and	deciding	what	makes	something	immoral.	The	current	study	appears	to	show	how	physiology	affects	the	reasoning	process	for	what	makes	something	immoral,	but	does	not	necessarily	show	how	physiology	directly	contributes	when	a	judgment	of	immorality	has	already	been	made.	Thus,	future	research	should	test	for	differences	of	SNS	impact	on	both	canonically	immoral	acts	and	acts	with	ambiguous	dyads.	
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Another	future	research	avenue	would	be	to	reexamine	the	role	of	the	immune	system	in	moral	judgment	using	the	replication	recommendations	made	earlier	in	the	discussion.	Specifically,	future	research	should	first	aim	to	measure	inflammation	in	participants	who	have	not	also	undergone	a	drug	treatment	or	otherwise	manipulation.	If	an	association	is	found,	researchers	should	then	attempt	to	integrate	the	inflammatory	process	with	the	SNS	to	see	how	the	two	function	in	tandem	to	contribute	to	moral	judgment.		At	present,	however,	the	current	research	is	useful	in	that	extends	a	common	understanding	of	the	SNS	as	a	mechanism	for	stress	to	a	mechanism	that	supplements	–	and	when	moral	in	nature,	harshens	–	our	judgments	with	affective	information	when	the	situation	is	ambiguous.														
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